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ABSTRACT 
 
Few political transformations have attacked social inequalities more thoroughly 
than the 1959 Cuban Revolution. As the survey data in this article show, however, 
sixty years on, structural inequalities are returning that echo the prerevolutionary 
socioethnic hierarchies. While official Cuban statistics are mute about social differ-
ences along racial lines, the authors were able to conduct a unique, nationwide 
survey with more than one thousand respondents that shows the contrary. Amid 
depressed wages in the state-run economy, access to hard currency has become key. 
However, racialized migration patterns of the past make for highly unequal access 
to family remittances, and the gradual opening of private business disfavors Afro-
Cubans, due to their lack of access to prerevolutionary property and startup capital. 
Despite the political continuity of Communist Party rule, a restructuring of Cuban 
society with a profound racial bias is turning back one of the proudest achieve-
ments of the revolution. 
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The 1959 Cuban Revolution radically broke with a past in which “class” tended to influence and overlap most aspects of social life, including “race,” gender, 
income, education, and territory. The “centralized, state-sponsored economy, which 
provided full employment and guaranteed modest income differences, was the great 
social elevator of the lower strata of society. As a result, by the 1980s Cuba had 
become one of the most egalitarian societies in the world” (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-
López 2005, 71). 
  © 2020 University of Miami. 
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
DOI 10.1017/lap.2019.59 
Katrin Hansing is an associate professor of sociology and anthropology at Baruch College, 
City University of New York. katrinhansing@gmail.com. ORCID 0000-0003-2769-1158. 
Bert Hoffmann is a senior research fellow at GIGA, the German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies, and a professor of political science at Freie Universität Berlin. bert.hoffmann@giga-
hamburg.de. ORCID 0000-0001-7522-3610. Conflicts of interest: Katrin Hansing and Bert 
Hoffmann declare none. 
       Sixty years after the triumph of the revolution, Communist Party rule persists. 
However, beneath this veneer of political continuity, socialist Cuba is undergoing a 
profound restructuring of its society. Social inequalities have become visible in 
everyday life. The political leadership is reluctant to address this issue, as it touches 
on a core aspect of its revolutionary legitimacy. As a result, Cuba’s National Office 
of Statistics (ONE) publishes little data on the widening socioeconomic gap.  
       This article provides new and substantial data on the restratification of Cuban 
society that is currently taking place. The authors were able to conduct a unique 
survey with 1,049 Cubans across the island, which clearly shows the growing pat-
terns of socioeconomic disparity. More disturbingly, it also reveals how strongly 
racialized this new social structure is.  
       The historical backdrop for the return of social inequalities is the demise of the 
Soviet Union, Cuba’s longtime ally and benefactor. In the 1990s, the island fell into 
a profound economic crisis (CEPAL 1997; Mesa-Lago 2005). The state economy’s 
capacity to provide basic goods and services, as well as incomes, sharply declined 
(Brundenius and Torres Pérez 2013; Domínguez et al. 2012), and the value of the 
Cuban peso (CUP) fell dramatically. In 1993 the government opened the country 
to a dual monetary system by allowing a hard currency to circulate—initially the 
U.S. dollar, which, over time, was replaced by the convertible peso, or CUC, which 
is pegged to the U.S. dollar (Ritter 1995; Ritter and Rowe 2002).  
       After the crisis hit rock bottom in 1993–94, the economy regained some stability, 
but with an exchange rate of 26:1, the dual currency situation continues to sharply 
divide both the economy and society to this day (Eckstein 2004; Vidal and Everleny 
2013). This is most visible in the devaluation of state salaries. In 2018, the average 
monthly salary was CUP 767 (ONE 2018), which translates into a mere US$30.1  
       It is in this context that alternative sources of income, other than state salaries, 
have acquired extraordinary significance. Two such sources stand out: money trans-
fers from abroad, generally referred to as remittances; and private market activities, 
whether informal or as legalized self-employment or small-scale businesses. How-
ever, the potential to tap into these resources is far from equally distributed in 
Cuban society. As a result, new social inequalities are emerging and doing so along 
clearly visible racial lines. 
       The growing inequalities in Cuba have been addressed by numerous scholars on 
and off the island (Bastian 2018; de la Fuente 2011; Espina Prieto 2010; Espina 
Prieto and Togores 2012; Hansing and Optenhögel 2015; Hansing 2017). While 
these studies provide important insights, most provide anecdotal evidence or are 
based on interviews, in-depth ethnographies, or biographical studies with limited 
scope. What they all struggle with is a lack of comprehensive data. Sarah Blue’s 
important contribution (2007) has so far provided the only survey data on the issue. 
However, it is limited to a sample of 334 families in the city of Havana and was 
undertaken in December 2000; that is, almost two decades ago, when remittances, 
and particularly investment in private business, were still on much lower levels, 
international travel was heavily restricted, and the Internet was inaccessible to most 
of the population.2 
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       As for official statistics, the Cuban census regularly collects a wide array of data. 
However, Cuba’s ONE publishes these data selectively, and some significant data 
not at all. Regarding income inequality, for instance, ONE publishes data only for 
salaries in Cuban pesos (CUP), not for the much more important hard currency 
incomes (CUC). Also, the Gini coefficient, the international standard measure for 
income inequalities, has been calculated only on a CUP basis. As such, it is all but 
meaningless, given the country’s dual currency context. This practice has now been 
discontinued, as no Gini score has been published since 2000 (Monreal 2018).3  
       Another key deficit in Cuba’s official statistics relates to the socioethnic com-
position of the population. The national census does ask about “skin color” (color 
de piel), using three categories: white, black, and mulatto. For a long time, how-
ever, data correlating “skin color” with income or other measures of social status 
were not published at all. As such, the Cuban government’s 2018 report to the 
United Nations (MINREX 2018, 10) heralded the National Office of Statistics’ 
publication Census Data by Skin Color (ONE 2016) as pathbreaking. This publica-
tion, however, omitted many important issues in which race has become a signifi-
cant social marker. Instead, the publication presented a selection of data that served 
to support the official discourse, according to which the revolution had largely 
overcome racial discrepancies. The publication’s summary concludes that “the dif-
ferences as to skin color found in this study have low statistical significance. They 
show no major differentials” (ONE 2016, 4).4 As our study will show, such a state-
ment says more about the Cuban National Office of Statistics than about Cuba’s 
contemporary society. 
       This article proceeds to outline the methodology used for the study’s survey, 
then to present key results on the links between race and inequality, including their 
underlying causes, as identified in the survey. Three factors that the survey identifies 
as crucial are highlighted: the impact of past migration patterns and family remit-
tances, the consequences of self-employment and small enterprises in the emergent 
private sector, and the impact of an additional, foreign citizenship, which has 
become important since the 2013 liberalization of Cuba’s migration policy. The 
concluding section reflects on the socioracial restratification currently under way in 
Cuba and asks what implications this may have for policymakers and other actors 
on and off the island. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
At the heart of this study lies a survey that was taken by 1,049 Cubans from across 
the island. The survey and accompanying in-depth interviews were conducted by 
Katrin Hansing and a four-member Cuban research team.5 The fieldwork was con-
ducted between January 2017 and April 2018. Despite the constraints involved in 
conducting surveys in Cuba, Hansing and her team’s long-term research experience 
has shown us that by selecting a cross-section of Cuban society based on age, gender, 
race, educational background, profession, and territorial or residential location, a 
semirepresentative survey and reliable results are possible.  
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       Whereas most studies of Cuba’s changing society tend to be heavily Havana-
centric, this survey was carried out nationwide, in urban as well as rural areas and in 
nearly all provinces (see map 1).  
       The survey comprised 57 questions, usually providing multiple-choice answers, 
and sometimes including subquestions.6 A note is due on the terms, categories, and 
method used in defining the respondents’ racial identity. The official Cuban census 
rejects the term race and instead uses the term skin color (ONE 2016, 7–9). Inter-
national studies on Latin America and the Caribbean use the terms race or ethnicity/ 
ethnic group. In this paper these terms are used interchangeably.7 
       The Cuban census allows for three different categories of skin color: white, 
black, and mulatto (ONE 2016, 4).8 In our survey, we used only two categories: 
white and Afro-Cuban. We are well aware that neither two nor three categories will 
do justice to the complexity and diversity of racial identities in Cuba. Any such cat-
egories cannot be more than a rough approximation, with all the deficits such a 
reduction of complexity entails. But given the societal relevance race has historically 
had and continues to have today, coping with the deficiencies of such categories is, 
in our view, better than not using them at all, and by doing so, being blind to the 
current social realities. 
       Our choice to use only two categories—one that includes all Cubans who are 
phenotypically white, the other all who are phenotypically of African descent—
stems from the fact that people who are phenotypically of African descent tend to 
share—in Cuba as elsewhere in the region—similar historical legacies, as well as 
contemporary social experiences. In Cuba, different terms for people of African 
descent are used, including afrodescendientes (Afrodescendants), cubanos de origen 
africano (Cubans of African heritage), and afrocubano/a (Afro-Cuban). We find the 
inclusive term Afro-Cuban most appropriate. This choice is also in line with other 
prominent scholarship on the matter (Rubiera Castillo and Martiatu Terry 2011; de 
la Fuente 2008; Helg 1995; Pérez Sarduy and Stubbs 2000).9 Moreover, official dis-
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Map 1. Number of Survey Respondents per Province
The number of responses for each province, from left to right: Pinar del Río 60, Artemisa 50, La 
Habana 199, Matanzas 90, Cienfuegos 36, Villa Clara 64, Sancti Spíritus 50, Ciego de Ávila 50, 
Camagüey 50, Las Tunas 50, Granma 50, Holguín 100, Santiago de Cuba 120, Guantánamo 80. 
course also tends to group blacks and mulattos together when it speaks of the mea-
sures taken to overcome issues of discrimination or underrepresentation (see, e. g., 
Castro 2018; see also note 24).  
       As to our method of racial identification: each interviewee was asked to identify 
him- or herself, and the interviewers were also asked to note down their classification 
of the person being interviewed. In all 1,049 cases, there was not one single discrep-
ancy between the interviewees’ and interviewers’ responses.  
       As mentioned, the survey sought to reflect a semirepresentative cross section of 
Cuban society. With regard to race and skin color, the Cuban census states that the 
population is 64 percent white and 36 percent black and mulatto combined (ONE 
2016, 4). Our survey slightly deviates from this ratio, in that it includes 57 percent 
whites (596 respondents) and 43 percent Afro-Cubans (453 respondents). For 
gender congruence, our data overlap with the official Cuban data: for 2016, the 
National Office of Statistics reports 50.19 percent female and 49.81 percent male 
residents (ONE 2017, 3–4); our survey has 50.14 percent female and 49.86 percent 
male respondents. On the territorial division, the capital city of Havana accounts for 
19 percent of respondents in our survey, which exactly mirrors its share of the 
national population: 2.13 million out of a total 11.24 million (ONE 2017, 3–4). 
Similarly, the five easternmost provinces account for 35 percent of the national pop-
ulation (ONE 2017, 3–4) and 36 percent of our survey. 
 
SOCIAL INEQUALITIES 
ALONG RACIAL LINES 
 
Social and racial inequality have been an integral part of Cuban society since the 
early days of the Spanish conquest. Africans were brought to Cuba as slaves as early 
as the sixteenth century but came in especially large numbers in the nineteenth cen-
tury, when Cuba became a prosperous sugar colony. The introduction of the sugar 
industry permanently changed the country’s social composition, shaping everything 
from property rights, labor systems, trade, and foreign relations to the island’s 
national culture and identity (Ortiz 1940). As such, it was key in the formation of 
the island’s race, class, and social relations. 
       After the abolition of slavery in 1886 and in the subsequent republican period 
(1902–59), race continued to determine people’s legal and social rights, as well as 
their economic status (De la Fuente 1995, 1999; Helg 1995, Fernández-Robaina 
1990). Afro-Cubans continued to be discriminated against and systematically 
excluded from higher positions in employment, public service, and politics and con-
tinued to make up the majority of the island’s poor and working classes (McGarrity 
and Cárdenas 1995).  
       With the triumph of the revolution in 1959, the race question was almost 
entirely subsumed under a broadly redemptive nationalist and subsequently socialist 
umbrella. The revolution moved rapidly to dismantle institutional racism and other 
forms of sociolegal inequality, and the 1976 Constitution explicitly prohibited any 
discrimination based on race or skin color. Beyond this, the revolutionary govern-
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ment approached the issue of race from a strongly structural perspective, coherent 
with its Marxist views of history and society. As such, it assumed that with the elim-
ination of private property and class exploitation, racial inequality and discrimina-
tion would eventually disappear. The economic, social, and political measures 
implemented by the revolutionary government mainly benefited people of humble 
origins, and thereby most Afro-Cubans (McGarrity 1992; Morales Domínguez 
2013). By the 1980s, Cuba had become a relatively egalitarian society, with low 
levels of racial inequality in key areas of professional and social life. 
       Despite these achievements, the revolution did not specifically target the soci-
ety’s deeply ingrained culture of racism. Instead, the ideological rationale and revo-
lutionary rhetoric of national unity and socialist equality introduced an official 
silence toward race-related matters, which transformed the issue into a semitaboo 
topic (De la Fuente 1998; Moore 1988). While race continued to influence social 
relations in the private realm, the revolution’s ideal of egalitarianism was shared by 
large sectors of the population. 
       The year 1989 marked a watershed moment. The collapse of Eastern European 
socialism meant the loss of guaranteed overseas markets and generous Soviet subsi-
dies. It sent Cuba’s economy into free fall, from which it has still not emerged. If 
the state-run economy was a powerful social elevator for the upward mobility of 
Afro-Cubans in the past, it was precisely the decline of the state economy that 
reversed this process after 1989. At the depth of the crisis in 1993, the government 
saw itself forced to legalize the U.S. dollar—essentially to secure the minimum of 
foreign exchange revenues deemed necessary for survival by tapping into remittances 
from emigrated relatives (Ritter 1995).10 Our survey data clearly reflect how much 
the socioeconomic divide has widened and how strongly these inequalities overlap 
with race. 
       As noted, the National Office of Cuban Statistics does not report on key 
income inequalities, since its publications provide data only on salaries in the highly 
devalued Cuban peso (CUP), thereby explicitly excluding hard currency earnings 
(e.g., ONE 2017, 4). Unsurprisingly, with this type of accounting, official income 
differences continue to be low. In contrast, our survey asked for income as measured 
in the convertible peso, or CUC. The results show a remarkable range. While almost 
three-quarters of the respondents reported an annual income of less than CUC 
3,000, 12 percent received between CUC 3,000 and 5,000, and 14 percent reported 
incomes higher than CUC 5,000 and up to CUC 100,000 annually. 
       While the data show that a sector of well-off Cubans is emerging, the contrasts 
are much stronger when we break this data down by race (see table 1). Among Afro-
Cubans, 95 percent report a yearly income below CUC 3,000. In contrast, only 58 
percent of white Cubans fall into this lowest income category. In turn, income levels 
above CUC 5,000 are limited almost exclusively to white Cubans. 
       Monetary income is not the only factor defining material status, particularly in 
a socialist country like Cuba, where state subsidies are prevalent. Cuba’s welfare pro-
visions have largely been nonmonetary, and although their quality and scope have 
eroded over time, they still need to be taken into account. As such, despite major 
34 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 62: 2
cutbacks, the food-rationing system still distributes basic food supplies at almost 
symbolic CUP prices. Education and healthcare are free, and public transportation, 
as well as arts, cultural, and sports events, are heavily subsidized. Also, given that 
most Cubans own their own home and rents are subsidized, housing costs are not 
as central a concern as elsewhere. However, because most state-run and private busi-
nesses have become CUC-based, it has become almost impossible for ordinary 
Cubans to satisfy their daily needs with their CUP salaries.  
       The increased monetization of socioeconomic affairs is a key ingredient of 
Cuba’s ongoing economic reform process. Access to a bank account is a good indi-
cator of how prepared people are for this. Here, too, our survey provides strong evi-
dence of the increasing race-based inequalities. Among white Cubans, 50 percent of 
respondents reported having a bank account; among Afro-Cubans, this was a mere 
11 percent (see table 2). 
       Savings, in bank accounts or elsewhere, are another important indicator of socioe-
conomic status. The level of savings shows not only how prepared people are to face 
adverse material circumstances but also how able they are to take advantage of possi-
bilities in the market sector of the Cuban economy. More than 62 percent of Afro-
Cubans but only 12 percent of whites in our survey report savings of less than CUC 
100 (see table 1). On the other end of the spectrum, while 45 percent of white Cubans 
have savings above CUC 500, this is the case for only 8 percent of Afro-Cubans.  
       The Internet came late to Cuba; it is monitored by the state and is very expen-
sive and slow (Hoffmann 2004; Periodismo de Barrio 2018). Nevertheless, it is a cru-
cial indicator of how well people are connected to modern communications and to 
HANSING, HOFFMANN: RACE AND RESTRATIFICATION IN CUBA 35
Table 1. Income and Savings by Race 
 
Annual income                                3,001–    5,001–   10,000–  20,001–  40,001– 
in CUC                            < 3,000    5,000     10,001    20,000    40,000    60,000  > 60,000 
Percent 
Total                                    74.2       11.9        3.3          2.0          2.8          2.4          0.8 
White                                   58.5       18.3        8.6          4.4          4.2          4.7          1.3 
   Without remittances         24.4       13.0      13.3          8.9        17.0        18.5          5.9 
   With remittances              68.5       20.2        7.2          3.0          0             0             0 
Afro-Cuban                          94.9         3.5        0.9          0.7          0             0             0 
   Without remittances         97.2         1.5        0.3          0.9          0             0             0 
   With remittances              89.1         6.6        2.3          0             0             0             0 
 
Savings in CUC                     0         1–100    101–       251–       501–     >3,000 
                                                                        250         500       3,000 
Percent 
Total                                      6.8       26.8      17.9        19.2        17.4        11.9 
White                                     1.3       11.0      19.1        23.6        25.1        19.9 
Afro-Cuban                          14.1       47.8      16.4        13.2          7.2          1.3 
 
Source: Authors‘ survey data
the social and economic benefits these can bring. There are no official data that pro-
vide information about the relationship between Internet access and racial identity, 
but our survey reveals a profound cleavage (see table 2). Among Afro-Cubans, 70 
percent responded that they had no Internet access whatsoever; among whites, this 
was down to 25 percent. Almost two-thirds of white Cubans do have access via 
public areas, such as the Wi Fi zones in public parks; for Afro-Cubans, this is a mere 
28 percent. Internet access at home is still low in all sectors of society but again, 
much lower among Afro-Cubans.11 
       A key step undertaken under Raúl Castro’s leadership was the migration law 
reform in 2013, which eliminated the domestic administrative obstacles for Cubans 
when leaving the island. Since then, travel has increased greatly. In a context in 
which the petty import business into Cuba is booming (Ravsberg 2018), travel pos-
sibilities constitute an important material asset. In our survey, 31 percent—almost 
one-third—of white Cubans reported having traveled since the migration law 
reform; among Afro-Cubans, this total was a mere 3 percent (see table 2). 
       Whether we look at income, access to a bank account, savings, Internet con-
nectivity, or travel abroad, our survey results show that the inequalities that have 
opened up in Cuban society are profoundly marked by race. We now turn to the 
driving forces behind this process.  
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Table 2. Selected Monetary and Social Indicators by Race (percent) 
 
                                                                                           White                     Afro-Cuban 
Bank account holder 
    Yes                                                                                   50.4                            11.5 
    No                                                                                   49.6                            88.5 
Internet access  
    Does not have                                                                  25.2                            70.0 
    In public areas                                                                 62.1                            27.8 
    At home                                                                           12.7                             2.2 
Travel abroad 
    Yes                                                                                   30.9                             3.3 
    No                                                                                   69.1                            96.7 
Remittance receiver 
    Total                                                                                78.1                            21.9 
    Yes                                                                                   77.3                            28.5 
    No                                                                                   22.7                            71.5 
Reason for not receiving remittances 
    I’m fine                                                                            62.2                             0.3 
    Family abroad does not send                                            9.6                            14.8 
    I do not have family abroad                                             28.1                            84.9 
 
Source: Authors’ survey data 
PAST MIGRATION PATTERNS  
AND THE IMPACT OF FAMILY REMITTANCES 
 
Migrant remittances have become an important source of external finance in much 
of the developing world. While one line of research has pointed to their positive 
effects, including the reduction of poverty, the provision of social security, and over-
all development (Orozco 2013; Ratha 2005), other studies have underscored their 
detrimental impact, stressing that they produce dependencies and lead to further 
outward migration (Dagher et al. 2008; Kapur 2004). 
       Although a latecomer to the group of remittance-receiving countries, Cuba’s 
intake from money transfers has more than doubled, from an estimated US$1.5 bil-
lion in 2008 to US$3.7 billion in 2018 (Havana Consulting Group 2019). This is 
a huge portion of the island’s yearly hard currency intake. To this should be added 
a large amount of remittances in kind (mostly consumer goods)—in 2018 estimated 
to be almost as high as the monetary remittances (Havana Consulting Group 
2019).12 However, the distribution of remittances in Cuban society is atypical for a 
country of the Global South, given the historic migration patterns on which these 
remittances are based. 
       In Mexico, Central America, and other countries in the region, it has typically 
been the lower strata of society that have emigrated to the United States. In contrast, 
in Cuba the 1959 revolution sparked the exodus of hundreds of thousands of mostly 
white upper- and middle-class Cubans, who had lost their power, property, privileges, 
and businesses. Between 1959 and 1973, more than half a million Cubans emigrated 
to the United States, most of whom settled in South Florida, especially Miami. In the 
following decades, other migrant cohorts enlarged the Cuban émigré community. 
Thanks to generous U.S. federal assimilation aid, the emigrants’ social backgrounds, 
and their own entrepreneurial spirit, they became one of the most successful immi-
grant communities in post–World War II history (Portes and Stepick 1993) and built 
one of the most powerful political lobbies in U.S. foreign policy (Portes 2007).  
       Despite the strong political rifts, the longstanding economic embargo, and 
deepseated emotional wounds, the two Cuban communities—on the island and in 
the U.S. diaspora—have been and continue to be much more closely connected 
than is usually publicly acknowledged. A wide range of transnational social, cultural, 
and religious ties have emerged over the past decades, of which family visits and the 
sending of remittances are the most visible (Cervantes-Rodríguez 2010; Hansing 
and Mahler 2003, 2005; Hoffmann 2005; Pedraza 2007). 
       The Cuban émigré community today represents all ages, provinces on the 
island, socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, religious affiliations, and polit-
ical views. In many ways, the Cuban diaspora reflects Cuba’s own diversity, with the 
exception of one key aspect; namely, the island’s racial composition. According to 
U.S. census data, of the more than 1.8 million Cuban-Americans, 85 percent are 
white (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). 
       This strongly racialized migration pattern has immediate consequences for 
remittances. Since the 1990s, a number of surveys have shed light on the impact and 
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uses of remittances in Cuba (Hansing and Orozco 2009, 2014), but Sarah Blue’s 
2007 study is the only one that has specifically focused on the relationship between 
remittances and race. However, as mentioned, her research focused on only a few 
neighborhoods in Havana, and it did so in 2000, when the volume of remittances 
was still much lower and private business possibilities much fewer. Since then, no 
substantial empirical research on the links between remittances and race has been 
undertaken.  
       Our survey confirms that remittances flow mainly along family lines. In fact, 
only 2 percent of respondents stated that the sender of their remittances was a 
friend, whereas for all others it was a family member. Among white respondents, 93 
percent had a family member abroad; among Afro-Cubans, only 34 percent did. 
This translates into unequal access to remittances. In our survey, a total of 56 per-
cent of respondents received remittances. Of these remittance receivers, 78 percent 
were white and only 22 percent Afro-Cuban (see table 2). We could call this a form 
of unequal, discriminatory economic development through remittances.  
       However, the most striking racial divide comes from the 44 percent of respon-
dents who did not receive remittances at all. When asked why they did not receive 
remittances, 85 percent of Afro-Cubans responded that they did not have family 
abroad, while among whites this was the case for only 28 percent (see table 2). 
Among Afro-Cubans, the remaining 15 percent said that their relatives abroad do 
not send money; for whites, this was 10 percent. However, there was a third cate-
gory: 62 percent of the whites without remittances said they do not receive any 
because they “are fine” (estoy bien). In other words, they do not need monetary sup-
port from their family abroad. Among Afro-Cubans, not a single respondent 
answered in this manner.  
       The general assumption is that people who receive remittances are better off 
than those who do not. This is also true in the case of Afro-Cubans. The 28 percent 
of Afro-Cubans who received remittances reported a slightly higher average income 
than those who did not (see table 1). However, the situation is different for white 
Cubans. Here, somewhat counterintuitively, those who received remittances 
reported significantly lower incomes (on average less than CUC 5,000 annually) 
than those who did not (on average more than CUC 8,000).  
       We find the explanation for this when we take a closer look at the group of 
white Cubans without remittances (see table 1). In all other categories—Afro-
Cubans with or without remittances and whites with remittances—the great major-
ity reported an income below CUC 3,000, with declining numbers for higher 
incomes. For whites without remittances, however, we see a camel-back pattern: a 
first “hump” of approximately 24 percent for the lowest income category, below 
CUC 3,000, but then a second “hump” of a combined 35 percent reporting 
incomes of either CUC 20,000–40,000 or CUC 40,000–60,000. 
       In other words, among whites who do not receive remittances, those who are 
relatively poor are a minority group, while a larger number is what we could call 
living above the remittance line. Given that their incomes are sufficiently high, they 
do not need money transfers from abroad to support them.  
38 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 62: 2
       The logistic regression on income for the four social groups that result from 
combining race and remittances underscores these findings (see table 3). Whites 
without remittances have the highest positive coefficient for having an income above 
CUC 3,000, followed by whites with remittances. Afro-Cubans, in contrast, show 
a negative correlation—less markedly if they have access to remittances, and more 
strongly if they do not. This also holds true when we control for age, gender, and 
educational level. The table shows that these factors do have a significant impact on 
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Coefficients 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Annual Personal Income                                     (1)              (2)              (3)              (4) 
Variables                                                         Group 1     Group 2     Group 3     Group 4 
Group 1: Afro-Cubans without                     –2.948*** 
    remittances                                                 (0.359) 
Group 2: Afro-Cubans with remittances                           –0.953* 
                                                                                          (0.353) 
Group 3: Whites without remittances                                                   2.200*** 
                                                                                                            (0.222) 
Group 4: Whites with remittances                                                                           0.614*** 
                                                                                                                               (0.168) 
Age = 1, 17–30                                                 (base)          (base)          (base)          (base) 
                                                                                                                                   
Age = 2, 31–40                                                 1.421***     1.187***     1.187***     1.266*** 
                                                                       (0.321)       (0.311)       (0.327)       (0.315) 
Age = 3, 41–50                                                 1.649***     1.410***     1.296***     1.517*** 
                                                                       (0.318)       (0.306)       (0.322)       (0.311) 
Age = 4, 51–60                                                 1.228***     1.393***     1.150***     1.412*** 
                                                                       (0.322)       (0.313)       (0.330)       (0.319) 
Age = 5, 61+                                                   –0.782*      –0.521        –0.572        –0.628 
                                                                       (0.468)       (0.461)       (0.501)       (0.474) 
Gender = 1, Female                                        –0.642***   –0.525***   –0.424**     –0.611*** 
                                                                       (0.176)       (0.168)       (0.177)       (0.171) 
Education = 1, University                                 1.607***     1.826***     1.651***     1.820*** 
                                                                       (0.176)       (0.166)       (0.179)       (0.168) 
Constant                                                        –2.065***   –2.549***   –2.866***   –2.930*** 
                                                                       (0.286)       (0.279)       (0.297)       (0.293) 
Observations                                             1,047          1,047          1,047          1,047 
Wald chi2                                                     198.4          175.3          243.5          181.3 
Degrees of freedom                                          7                 7                 7                 7 
Prob > chi2                                                       0                 0                 0                 0 
 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Annual personal income > CUC 3,000 (= US$) 
Source: Authors’ survey data
income, but it is a very similar one within each of the four categories. The much 
bigger difference is not within but between the categories of race and remittances. 
 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
AND SMALL ENTERPRISES 
 
When, in the 1990s, the U.S. dollar was legalized in Cuba and remittances started 
to pour in, these mainly served, as they have elsewhere, as a private social safety net. 
Sarah Blue’s research (2007), conducted in 2000, showed how access to remittances 
translated into higher levels of consumption. This is still the case for many, but the 
current economic reform process has given remittances a new significance that goes 
beyond these differences in daily consumption.  
       In the mid-1990s, when the first legal spaces for self-employment, such as pri-
vate restaurants (paladares) and room rentals, were opened up, these remained lim-
ited and narrowly controlled by the state (Ritter 1998). Since 2006, under Raúl 
Castro’s leadership, the gradual opening up of private sector activities has picked up 
speed and become part of the government’s long-term strategy (PCC 2011; Hoff-
mann 2016). These reforms have changed Cuba’s economic landscape, turning pri-
vate vendors and services, as well as cafeterias, into a regular part of daily life. Remit-
tances now no longer merely serve as a private safety net but have become a key 
source of capital for investment. 
       The National Office of Statistics report on the census data according to skin 
color does address what it calls the “participation in the so-called emergent sector of 
the economy” (ONE 2016, 37). For those working as self-employed, it does find 
higher participation of whites than Afro-Cubans. The self-employed make up 8.6 
percent of whites versus 6.4 percent of blacks and 6.6 percent of mulattoes. The 
publication concludes that there is “a certain difference in favor of whites” (ONE 
2016, 37).13 
       In the official statistics, this imbalance is still relatively modest. But this is only 
the case because the National Office of Statistics publication does not distinguish 
between different types of private sector activities or between the different levels of 
income that they generate. Actually, there is enormous diversity in terms of what 
falls under so-called private sector activities, ranging from street vendors, who sell 
peanuts for a few pesos cubanos (CUP), to people who own and rent out private 
rooms or entire apartments to foreigners in hard currency, or CUC. In contrast to 
the National Office of Statistics data, our survey did take these differences in private 
sector income into account. 
       The Cuban government has long insisted on keeping private economic activi-
ties small-scale. The very term self-employed work (trabajo por cuenta propia), rather 
than small or medium enterprises, keeps this sector linguistically in the realm of 
workers, not entrepreneurs. In practical and legal terms, there are also numerous 
restrictions to prevent private sector businesses from growing “too much.” As a 
result, most activities are indeed small-scale, and while they generate higher incomes 
than the state sector, most people earn a fairly modest living.  
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       Our survey reflects this. Of the 286 respondents undertaking private sector 
activities, more than 60 percent reported sales of less than CUC 500 per month. 
However, the racialized stratification within this sector becomes evident when these 
data are disaggregated along racial lines (see table 4). Of the Afro-Cubans engaged 
in private sector activities, 77 percent have sales below CUC 250 per month; among 
whites this is a mere 30 percent. Among high-revenue businesses we find the oppo-
site. Almost half of the self-employed whites have monthly sales above CUC 500, 
compared to a mere 7 percent among self-employed Afro-Cubans. Almost a third of 
white Cubans in this sector reported monthly sales above CUC 1,000; not a single 
Afro-Cuban did.  
       The differences in income in Cuba’s private sector depend largely on the type 
of activities the self-employed engage in. Two types of businesses can be considered 
high-revenue activities: the room and apartment rentals that have grown at par with 
the boom in tourism, and the paladares, which cater mainly to tourists and to the 
small but growing number of relatively high-income Cubans. Because the laws do 
not allow the leasing or acquisition of state property for these activities, both room 
rentals and restaurants depend crucially on the availability of large private homes.  
       Here, the issue of prerevolutionary property is significant. After 1959, the rev-
olutionary government confiscated private businesses and seized all rental housing 
properties. Under the Urban Reform Law of 1960, an individual was allowed to 
keep one private home (house or apartment) and one vacation home, at the beach 
or in the country (Coyula and Hamberg 2004, 18). Until the 1990s, this meant that 
certain individuals and families were privileged in terms of their housing situation, 
but not much more. However, with the legalization of private room and home 
rentals and restaurants in the 1990s, the grand mansions and spacious apartments 
from the prerevolutionary era became the crucial base for entering and benefiting 
from the most lucrative segments of the new market economy. Given the racialized 
stratification of Cuba’s pre-1959 society, the access to such real estate—and hence 
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Table 4. Business Sales and Type of Business by Race 
 
Monthly sales of the current  
business in CUC                       1–250        251–500     501–1,000   1,001–3,000    > 3,000 
Percent                                                                                                                              
    White                                     29.8             22.2             17.3              17.8             12.9 
    Afro-Cuban                            77.0             16.4              6.6                 0                  0 
                        Room 
Type of            rental/                          Simple        Beauty    Produc-   Services                 Other 
business             B&B   Restaurant    gastronomy    services       tion       (crafts)   Vendor   services 
Percent 
  White             30.0         4.4              13.7          13.7         8.0         10.2       5.8      14.2 
  Afro-Cuban     1.6          0                14.8          11.5         6.6         19.7      27.9      18.0 
 
Source: Authors’ survey data
the possibility of opening a restaurant or a bed and breakfast—has starkly disfavored 
Afro-Cubans. 
       This “property bias” was given further fuel by Law 288, which, as part of Raúl 
Castro’s economic reform agenda, legalized the buying and selling of private prop-
erty. This recommodification evidently favors prerevolutionary elites who kept their 
property, as well as those revolutionary cadres who, after 1959, were allotted confis-
cated property to live in.14 It also favors a third, often overlapping sector; namely, 
those with family members abroad willing and able to finance real estate acquisitions 
on the island.15 In racial terms, this circumstance again tilts strongly in favor of 
white Cubans. 
       Our survey data on occupations in the emergent private sector provide evidence 
of the resulting racial imbalances. Among self-employed Afro-Cubans, the largest 
share is that of petty vendors (28 percent), followed by craftspeople (20 percent) and 
small-scale gastronomic services (15 percent) (see table 4). In our survey, no Afro-
Cuban owns a private restaurant, and only one respondent (2 percent) reported 
renting out accommodations. In contrast, among whites, renting private accommo-
dation is the single biggest category (30 percent); restaurants are relatively few, at 
only 4 percent, but this is a category in which Afro-Cubans are entirely absent. Petty 
vendors, the number one category among Afro-Cubans, accounts for only 6 percent 
of white respondents.16  
       If we single out the two categories identified as high-revenue activities—private 
accommodations and restaurants—a stunning 98 percent of businesses are in the 
hands of white Cubans. Most of these people report that they do not receive remit-
tances. In fact, this is the core of those who do not receive remittances because, as 
they say, “they are fine.” There may, however, also be a semantic issue at work. The 
concept of remittances (remesas) usually refers to a relatively small amount of money 
that is sent to an individual or a family to help them cover their basic monthly costs. 
The Cubans who “are fine” may, in fact, be receiving money from relatives abroad 
but may not see this as remittances; instead, they may view it as startup capital or as 
a joint “family investment” to purchase a house or car, renovate a home, or start a 
business. The new economics of labor migration conceive of “remittances as an 
intrafamily loan arrangement” (Poirine 1997), and this is the prototypical Cuban 
version of it. 
 
IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL  
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP 
 
As we have seen, transnational links based on past racialized migration patterns have 
had an enormous impact on the restructuring of Cuban society currently taking 
place. As part of this, another factor comes into play; namely, the ability or inability 
to obtain a second, foreign citizenship.  
       This issue gained prominence in Cuba when, in 2007, a Spanish law—collo-
quially called the grandchildren’s law (ley de nietos)—gave the right to acquire Span-
ish citizenship to whoever could claim to have a Spanish grandparent.17 In many 
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countries, people of Spanish descent took advantage of this possibility to obtain a 
Spanish—and thereby an EU—passport, but in Cuba the impact was enormous. As 
of 2018, more than 110,000 Cubans had become Spanish citizens under this law, 
and another 70,000 applications were still being processed (Reigosa González 2018; 
De Blas 2018). 
       In our survey, 68 of 1,049 respondents reported holding a second citizenship. Of 
these, 85 percent held Spanish citizenship; the remainder were split among different 
nationalities, acquired mostly through marriage.18 This underscores the crucial impact 
of Spain’s “grandchildren’s law.” Because it is based on Spanish ancestry, it is of little 
surprise that access to Spanish citizenship is, exceptions apart, a privilege of white 
Cubans. In our sample, there was not a single dual citizen among the Afro-Cubans.  
       A second citizenship is of great value in many parts of the world, as the spread 
of citizenship-by-investment programs shows (Shachar 2017). In Cuba, the privi-
leges of an EU passport are immediately tangible: such a passport is the key to inter-
national mobility. Since the migration law reform eliminated the administrative 
hurdles for leaving the island, obtaining a visa to enter Europe, the United States, 
or most other countries has become the bottleneck constraining Cubans’ travel pos-
sibilities, not Cuban regulations. However, Cubans with an EU passport bypass 
these visa requirements. The survey data show how much more international mobil-
ity takes place among dual citizens: 98 percent had traveled abroad since the 2013 
migration law, compared to a mere 14 percent of those with only Cuban citizenship.  
       Travel possibilities are the key resource for the flourishing petty import busi-
ness, which brings everything from clothes to cellphones and from makeup to air 
conditioners into the country. In addition, an EU passport paves the way to opening 
a bank account abroad, which is of much value for transnational business, renting 
apartments, or getting a credit card. The privileges also extend to the family, as 
spouses of Spanish citizens are given the right of residence and, over time, can also 
obtain citizenship.  
       In all survey questions on material status, the group of Cubans with a second 
citizenship came out on top. Regarding income, 47 percent of dual nationals were 
in the highest income categories of CUC 20,000 or more per year, compared to less 
than 3 percent of those with only Cuban citizenship. Except for one respondent, all 
dual nationals had family abroad; all others either received remittances or did not 
need them (estoy bien). In spite of the high number of senior citizens among the dual 
nationals, more than half of them had their own business, which, in four out of five 
cases, meant one of the two high-revenue businesses, renting accommodations or 
running a restaurant. 
       It should be noted that Cuba’s 1976 Constitution was explicit in not allowing 
Cubans to hold a second citizenship. Article 32 states, “Dual citizenship is not 
admitted. As a consequence, if a foreign citizenship is acquired, the Cuban citizen-
ship will be lost” (República de Cuba 1992).19 In practice, however, over the years 
it became fully accepted that Cubans held a second passport and made use of it 
when they were outside the country. The 2019 constitutional reform gave this prac-
tice constitutional standing in the reformed article on citizenship, now Article 36, 
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which is explicit in stating, “Acquisition of another citizenship does not imply loss 
of the Cuban citizenship” (República de Cuba 2019, Art. 36).20 
       While the group of Cuban dual nationals is not significant in number, it is cen-
tral to who makes up the top echelons of Cuba’s new social structure. In a context 
in which international mobility is a key economic asset, these individuals are among 
the major players. The impact is particularly striking because the coveted EU pass-
port is accessible almost exclusively to a social group that is already better off; 
namely, white Cubans with family abroad. It is a privilege that comes on top of, and 
reinforces, an already favorable social status.  
 
CUBA’S SOCIORACIAL RESTRATIFICATION: 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
As this article has shown, social and racial inequalities are rapidly increasing in 
Cuba. Whereas Blue, on the basis of her 2000 survey data, had already diagnosed 
an “erosion of racial equality” (Blue 2007), this has now taken on a new character: 
not only have living standards become less equal, but a comprehensive structural 
reconfiguration of Cuban society is taking place. 
       From a comparative perspective, the socioeconomic cleavages on the island are 
not as profound, and the racial imbalances are not yet as deeply engrained, as in 
numerous other Latin American countries. The universal coverage of social services, 
including education and health, continues to be—despite their eroding quality—an 
important factor in maintaining social cohesion. Also, the political bureaucracies of 
the party, state, and security apparatus provide avenues of social ascension for Afro-
Cubans, as do sports, the arts, and culture.  
       Moreover, recently the government stepped up its commitment to give Afro-
Cubans a stronger presence in state leadership functions. Most visibly, of the six vice 
presidents of the Díaz-Canel government named in the National Assembly meeting 
of April 2018, three are Afro-Cuban, including the first vice president. In his closing 
speech at the event, Raúl Castro explicitly framed this as part of what he called the 
“battle for proportions” (political scientists would speak of “descriptive representa-
tion”), highlighting that “in the new Council of State blacks and mulattos make up 
45.2 percent,” and among the National Assembly deputies, 40.49 percent (Castro 
2018).21  
       Nevertheless, given that overcoming social inequalities and racial discrimination 
has been at the very core of the revolutionary project, the growing social and racial 
restratification described in this study is dramatic and a source of enormous popular 
frustration.22 Moreover, it has a number of immediate political implications.  
       For one, the increasing social inequalities lend urgency to the reform of Cuba’s 
social welfare system. At present, the system is based on the principle of universal, 
equal coverage. As such, for example, all Cubans receive the highly subsidized food 
provisions via a ration system, regardless of whether they need them or not. The 
issue of moving from a universal ration card system to a targeted social safety pro-
gram based on need has been on Cuba’s reform agenda for many years without 
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being tackled (Carranza Valdés et al. 1996). Postponing its implementation has not 
helped to curb social inequalities.  
       There is much at stake. For the socialist government, rising inequalities touch 
on a key pillar of political legitimacy. Although Raúl Castro’s reform agenda bid 
farewell to the excessive egalitarianism of the past, the state and party leadership still 
claim to be the guardians of social justice and societal cohesion. A central instru-
ment in this regard has been to put the brakes on the growth of the private sector; 
for instance, by restricting the size of businesses, freezing the licensing process, clos-
ing down restaurants, or cracking down on middlemen with much fanfare. How-
ever, it is precisely this attitude that has prevented the reform process from gaining 
sufficient dynamism to propel economic development. As Cuban economist 
Ricardo Torres (2018) comments, “We have almost always tried to solve the issue 
of equality by equalizing downward.” 
       Not only is the brake on the private sector at odds with the hopes of economic 
growth through reform, it also fails to recognize that the root cause of the widening 
social gap is not the opening of small businesses but the massive decline of the state 
sector. Real wages are still at an estimated 39.3 percent of what they were in 1989.23 
The state economy, which used to be the great social elevator, has now had the 
reverse effect. The crucial issue, then, is not so much to curb the growth of the pri-
vate sector but to overcome the inefficiencies of the state sector in order to allow real 
wages to regain purchasing power.  
       The debate on social inequalities, even if it suffers from a lack of data, has by now 
become an issue of public discourse in Cuba. But the racial connotations of these 
inequalities are largely being dismissed. Scholars, as well as activists on the island, have 
called for the National Office of Statistics to publish data on the relationship between 
race and social inequality in more meaningful ways. In the words of the Afro-Cuban 
scholar Esteban Morales Domínguez: “The Cuban population is treated as a homoge-
nous mass. This is an error of incalculable magnitude . . . ‘black skin color’ has always 
been a category of social differentiation—a category that is not taken into considera-
tion by our national statistics apparatus” (2018).24 This is what our research has 
addressed. Its analysis shows how strongly the prerevolutionary racialized social struc-
ture is shaping the current reproduction of social inequalities. With much less access 
to financial capital, goods, and mobility, Afro-Cubans are being clearly disadvantaged. 
In the current restratification of Cuban society, this racial bias is turning back one of 
the proudest historic achievements of the Cuban Revolution. 
 
NOTES 
 
        The authors thank the team of Cuban colleagues for their outstanding work in carrying 
out the survey on the island, Ana Lluberes and Simone Gotthardt for their research assistance 
in the elaboration of the data, and the four anonymous LAPS reviewers for their thoughtful 
comments. All translations are by the authors. 
        1. In mid-2019 the government announced sweeping wage and pension increases for 
almost 1.5 million state employees, which would bring the average salary up to 1,067 pesos, 
according to the government (Díaz-Canel 2019). However, although the measure was accom-
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panied by a wide range of price controls, fears are that this increase in state expenditure might 
have inflationary effects that would eventually “eat up” the increase in real terms. As of this 
writing, it is too early to tell; therefore we decided not to update the 2018 average salary value 
and its USD equivalent.  
        2. Díaz-Briquets (2008) used a telephone survey to assess the impact of remittances on 
households in Cuba, finding a higher inclination of whites than Afro-Cubans to receive 
remittances (156). However, the author himself is aware of the limited validity of the results 
from this survey method, conceding that “the telephone survey results cannot be ascribed to 
the Cuban population at large as they are only applicable to the population of telephone 
land line subscribers. A reasonable assumption is that the vast majority of phone lines in 
Cuba are located in urban areas and among economically better-off households” (Díaz-
Briquets 2008, 156). 
        3. Official data for Cuba’s Gini index based on CUP indicate that it rose from .24 in 
1986 to .38 in 2000, when the last figures were made available (Frank 2018). 
        4. Orig. Los diferenciales por color de la piel encontrados en este estudio son poco 
significativos desde el punto de vista estadístico. No aparecen marcados diferenciales. 
        5. The Cuban research team included an Afro-Cuban female anthropologist from Santa 
Clara, who administered the surveys in the center of the island; a white Cuban female 
sociologist and an Afro-Cuban male anthropologist from Santiago de Cuba, who worked in 
Cuba’s eastern provinces; and a white female economist from Havana who, together with 
Katrin Hansing, worked in Havana and in the western provinces. Thanks to years of 
cooperation with this team in previous surveys (Hansing and Orozco 2011; Hansing and 
Orozco 2014), the project could build on extraordinarily strong relations of trust, which 
enabled the research to overcome the challenges of conducting surveys in Cuba. The team was 
trained to select survey subjects to be as representative of the key social categories of Cuban 
society as possible.  
        6. The main categories (which included numerous subcategories) were Personal/Demo-
graphic Data; Remittances; Current Private Business; Future Private Business; Interest in 
Investing in an Economic Activity; Banking Services, Savings, and Other Financial Activities; 
Citizenship, Migration, and Travel.  
        7. We adhere to the statement on race adopted by the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation: http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm.  As such, we understand the term race 
(racial and racism) to be a social construction and use it as such throughout this text. Please 
note that the word race and its associations are used hereafter without italics. 
        8. Until the 2002 census, it was the interviewer who defined what racial category iden-
tified individuals. Since 2012, the method has been changed, and now allows for the inter-
viewee to identify him- or herself (ONE 2016, 10). According to the National Statistics 
Office, there was no bias by method, as evidenced in the fact that there was no significant 
change in the data following the change of method (ONE 2016, 10). 
        9. In the current debate on the island, Abreu (2014) has emphatically argued for the use 
of the term afrocubano/a, as it represents a “theoretic space which the tradition of the 
antiracist and decolonizing school of thought in Cuba has constructed throughout the twen-
tieth century.” (Orig: espacio teórico que la tradición del pensamiento antirracista y descolo-
nizador cubano construyó a lo largo del siglo XX.) In 2019, an open letter by the Afro-activist 
Cofradía de la Negritud (Black Brotherhood) to President Díaz-Canel similarly took issue 
with what it sees as the government’s rejection of the term Afro-Cuban, linked to its insistence 
on the “non-existence of structural or institutional racial discrimination in Cuba” (Mesa Car-
bonell 2019). 
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        10. The Cuban leadership certainly was aware that the legalization of the U.S. currency 
brought about undesirable effects but still was inevitable. In announcing the step, Fidel 
Castro himself explicitly stated, “we do not like some of these measures” (Castro 1993, orig. 
algunas de estas medidas no nos gustan). 
        11. These data are, of course, a snapshot. The introduction of G3 mobile Internet serv-
ices on the island in December 2018, as well as the legalization of private WiFi in 2019, 
expanded Internet access among Cubans—though probably reinforcing instead of  diminish-
ing inequalities of access.  
        12. Nova González (2019) provides ample evidence of the different forms these remit-
tances in kind take.  
        13. Orig.: cierto diferencial en favor de los blancos. 
        14. In this context, Bastian (2018, 125) speaks of the beneficiaries as “Cuba’s two his-
torical ruling classes: the children and grandchildren of prerevolutionary elites who remained 
in Cuba after the Revolution, and the descendants of revolutionary leaders.” 
        15. In fact, prices of the transactions on the island are often underdeclared to minimize 
taxation; it is not rare that the undeclared part of the transaction takes place offshore, passing 
from one Miami bank account to another. 
        16. Private taxi and transport services are another sector in which prerevolutionary 
property—and hence pre-1959 ethnic hierarchies—weigh heavily.  
        17. The official name is Historical Memory Law (Ley de Memoria Histórica). Its main 
purpose was to heal wounds from the country’s civil war and to give recognition to the vic-
tims of the Franco dictatorship (Gobierno de España 2007). Granting citizenship to the 
grandchildren of Spanish émigrés was not at the core but merely an “additional disposition” 
of the law. While there were emotional debates about the law as such, this aspect was hardly 
discussed in Spain when the law was passed (Golías Pérez 2016, 83).  
        18. Another rapidly growing group of dual citizenship holders are Cubans who have 
emigrated and become naturalized abroad and then decided to repatriate to Cuba. This 
group, called repatriados (repatriated), is a recent phenomenon, and according to the director 
of Cuban Consular Services, more than forty thousand applications for repatriation have been 
filed since 2013 (Gamez Torres 2018). Many of these repatriated Cubans are, in part, 
reclaiming their Cuban citizenship in order to buy property on the island, a right that is still 
exclusively reserved for Cuban residents.  
        19. Orig. No se admitirá la doble ciudadanía. En consecuencia, cuando se adquiera una 
ciudadanía extranjera, se perderá la cubana. 
        20. Orig. La adquisición de otra ciudadanía no implica la pérdida de la ciudadanía 
cubana. 
        21. Orig. todavía nos queda la batalla de la proporción en los aspectos no solo numéricos, 
como dije, sino cualitativos, en lugares decisorios. . . . Tres mujeres fueron elegidas vicepresidentas 
del Consejo de Estado, dos de ellas negras. . . . [En la composición del Consejo de Estado] la repre-
sentación de negros y mestizos alcanzó el 45,2 per ciento . . . [entre los diputados a la Asamblea 
Nacional] la representación de negros y mestizos alcanzó el 40,49 per ciento, y así debe seguir. 
        22. The issue of Afro-Cuban discontent on the island surfaced prominently in interna-
tional media with the publication of an article by Roberto Zurbano in the New York Times 
(2013). It also kicked off a controversial debate on the island itself, which has been docu-
mented in part in a special issue of the Afro-Hispanic Review (vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 2014). 
The so-called Zurbano incident is also the point of departure for West-Durán (2018) to crit-
ically discuss Cuba’s “racial contract” in times of economic reform. 
        23. Data for 2016 (Mesa-Lago 2018). 
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        24. Orig: La masa poblacional cubana es tratada de manera homogénea. Lo cual es un error 
de magnitud incalculable [. . .] el “color negro,” se ha comportado, funcionado siempre como una 
variable de diferenciación social. Variable, que casi nunca ha sido tomada en consideración por 
nuestro aparato estadístico nacional. 
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